Unlocking the Riches of Oz

SLAVERY/AFFORDABILITY

Exactly two hundred years after the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, is
it possible that our taxation and landholding systems are evolving into a more
subtle form of slavery?

The unfortunate English sociopath Edward Gibbon Wakefield, who abducted then
married two young heiresses, dreamed up a theory of colonisation whilst in
Newgate Prison for the second of these offences from 1827 to 1830. Wakefield
espoused that new settlements required neither slaves nor convicts for cheap
labour; a compliant workforce may be had simply by selling land at ‘sufficient
price’ that only the wealthy would be able to afford it. Wakefield had stumbled
upon the high-land price, high-taxing formula that Pliny the Elder said had been
the ruin of Ancient Rome: Latifundia perdidere Italiam. [“The great landed estates destroyed Italy”].

It is this selfsame socially damaging regime into which at the
outset of the 21st century world economies have morphed.

Unlocking the Riches of Oz uses Australian data as a proxy for the economies of
the world to confirm this thesis.

SYNOPSIS

This report collates Australia’s real estate sales since 1972 to create ‘The
Barometer of the Economy’. As the barometer demonstrates a delayed inverse
relationship between property bubbles and the economy, we investigate the
extent of Australia’s publicly-generated natural resource rent in order to assess
the scope for ‘Unlocking the Riches of Oz’ currently suppressed by the
deadweight costs of taxation. Re-calculating GDP on the assumption of the
notional public capture of one half of Australia’s resource rent since 1972, we
show the benefits that would flow to all Australians, the environment, housing
affordability and industrial relations by reducing taxes in favour of greater
reliance on resource rents to be substantial.

INTRODUCING THE TAX SYSTEM

Pure rent is in the nature of a ‘surplus’ which can be taxed without affecting production
incentives. - Economics (2nd Australian Edition) Samuelson, Hancock and Wallace,  p.623

Revenues sourced from other than the capture of annual land and natural
resource values all offend against at least one of the four classical canons of
taxation, namely, that revenues should (1) bear lightly upon production, (2) be
cheap and easy to collect, (3) be certain, and not able to be passed on and, (4)
bear equally, giving advantage to none (Progress and Poverty, chapter 33).
Therefore, the almost complete lack of interest in establishing a community claim
to the land values generated by public infrastructure and the existence of
community as the primary source of public revenue is curious. It is perhaps best
understood in terms of a media bias thought to favour its real estate advertisers,
even though they too can be shown to benefit from land-based revenues.
Amazingly, the forces of both left and right have fallen under the spell of this
blinkered mind-set, and the idea of extending land value capture has rated little
discussion.

Poll-driven governments are therefore unlikely to be burdened by matters of
principle in considering from whence they will draw their revenues.
Considerations of the canons of taxation will go out the window in favour of
cynicism such as ‘The art of taxation consists of so plucking the goose as to
obtain the largest amount of feathers with the least amount of hissing’ (Jean
Baptiste Colbert, 1619-1683), or the modern equivalent, the metaphorical ‘three
legged stool’, ie. that a mix of taxes on incomes, sales and property provides the
most ‘stable’ tax base. Politics being deemed to be the art of the possible, it
appears that policy makers and politicians have decided to appease noisy landed
interests by up-taxing productive activities and down-taxing resource rents, the
canons of taxation and the axiom that ‘taxes destroy’ notwithstanding.

Given the lack of intellectual rigour concerning the equitable sourcing of revenue,
it isn’t surprising that tax systems have run amok and developed into a Mad
Hatter’s Tea Party. A welter of tax legislation is directed towards fining labour
and capital for working, and rewarding property holders and speculators for
inflating socially damaging property bubbles. Those who follow the imperatives of
the tax system by turning to rent-seeking tend to do very well for themselves,
while all others tend to do poorly. Taxes on productive transactions impede the
supply of goods and services and therefore raise prices, feeding inflation and
increasing the unemployment rate ‘required’ to lower wages sufficiently to
stabilise inflation. This unemployment rate is accepted as ‘natural’, and even
defined as ‘full employment’. All these effects widen the gap between a minority
of haves and the vast majority of have-nots, despite transfer payments
nominally targeted to narrow the poverty gap. Paradoxically, those most
disadvantaged by the tax system cling to the forlorn hope that it may be tinkered
with in order to redistribute wealth more justly. It cannot - unless the three
legged stool’s extremely shortened ‘property’ leg is replaced. This conclusion will
be tested by analysis of Australia’s real estate sales, some 70% of which,
including vacant land sales, is now represented by land price. Importantly, this
compares with the far lesser figure of 25% in 1970.

To date, all discussion about declining housing affordability has ignored that in a rational market land price is simply the private capitalisation of publicly generated
annual land values, as explained below in italics. When the land market develops into a bubble, the rational price is inflated by a temporarily self-fulfilling expectation of capital gain.

How does land price arise?

If residential returns in a particular locality are showing 4.0% after deduction of
$1000 in municipal rates, and if vacant lots are selling for $200,000, the
indicated annual value of sites is $8000 per lot net of rates [i.e. 4.0% of
$200,000].
However, if half this imputed annual yield were captured for public revenue, the
price of the sites would immediately fall from $200,000 to $100,000, as the
$4000 annual value remaining uncaptured by government would be privately
capitalised at 4.0%. That is, people would be prepared to pay a capital sum of
$100,000 for a site on which they did not to have to pay the annual value of
$4000 to government.
On the other hand, if the existing council rates of $1000 were abolished on the
sites, their price would increase from $200,000 to $225,000 (i.e. $9000 annual
value capitalised at 4.0%).
So, whether people realise it or not, land price is actually the private
capitalisation of imputed site rent remaining on a site, developed or undeveloped,
after deduction of government charges.
Hence, as taxes in other areas of the economy act to increase prices,
policymakers should consider greater land value capture as the most effective
way to reduce land prices and improve ‘housing’ (read land) affordability,
because there would remain less annual site value to be capitalised into land
price. [This analysis deals with the effect on land prices due to annual charges on
land. It does not allow for effects on land prices due to changes in spending
power caused by other kinds of taxes or tax reductions. Neither does it allow for
bubbles. These matters are addressed elsewhere in the text.]

Land price is now the greater part of residential property values in Australia, so it
may be that greater public capture of annual land values has much to commend
it on at least four fronts: (1) reducing land prices, or at least dampening
speculative price increases by imposing a holding cost on speculators, (2)
providing scope to redress a Mad Hatter’s tax regime which penalises work and
employment, (3) establishing a citizens’ claim to Australia’s natural resource
values and, (4) assisting to foster a natural job-shift, away from further intensive
urban agglomeration, towards cheaper and more decentralised locations.
A vast government workforce currently administers well-intentioned transfer
payments which are categorised and distinguished unnecessarily and at great
cost to the nation. It would be far cheaper were all Australians to claim their
equal birthright to the annual surplus, national resource rents, in the form of a
yearly citizen’s dividend. Whilst a guaranteed annual income has remained a pipe
dream, it need not, and there could be no sounder foundation than community generated resource rents.

In order to make land more affordable, Alan Moran, head of the Institute for
Public Affairs (IPA) Deregulation Unit has recently promoted greater release of
broadacre lands for residential subdivision. However, this is an indirect and
ineffective way of reducing land prices. In The Tragedy of Planning: Losing the
Great Australian Dream (IPA, 2006), Moran makes a case against the ‘regulatory
morass’ into which Australia’s town planning has descended, showing it to be
akin to California’s. He fails, however, to mention the substantially higher than
average crime rates in those US cities he approvingly cites as having a more
relaxed attitude to zoning more land for residential development on the urban
periphery. Ironically, the higher crime rates in those cities may have contributed
to their lower land prices, therefore, greater ‘housing’ affordability, because
increased rates of crime will usually prove to be the corollary of inadequate social
infrastructure on the urban fringe. Perhaps those people living within Australia’s
‘urban sprawl’, a term to which Moran objects, are not doing as they wish, as he
suggests, but are following the dictates of job opportunities as they must. Under
a tax code delivering enormously disproportionate benefits to Australia’s capital
cities, the cities are where jobs are most likely be found. The largest capital gains
are also to be found in the best parts of our major cities, and whilst investors
refer to this as ‘location, location, location’, economists know it as ‘Ricardo’s Law’
- that is, those locations where supra-marginal rents are greatest.

It is quite natural that many young people will be attracted to the vibrancy of the
big city, but how many might have eventually returned home had the benefits of
‘location, location, location’ been recognised by geo-spatially based revenue
systems which acknowledge relative locational values? We witness instead the
private plunder of vast slabs of community resource rents, whether by Russian
oligarchs or Nigerian oil crooks abroad, or to a lesser extent by Macquarie Bank
and leveraged buyouts of our natural resources at home. The cost to everybody
but the proponents of these insidious rent-seeking techniques is an increasingly
pernicious tax system, higher and higher land prices and declining levels of social
welfare.

In a recent book Ricardo’s Law: House Prices and the Great Tax Clawback Scam,
British economist and journalist Fred Harrison takes his readers on a journey
from the centre of London northwards along the ancient Roman road to Lincoln
and onwards to Hadrian’s wall. Harrison documents that wealth, property values,
and the very length of life itself, all decrease as the trip proceeds north through
England’s six statistical divisions along the way. He notes London’s parasitical
dependence on these far-flung locations for its surplus tax funding, and that
London redistributes only part of this ill-gotten gain back to the benefit of these
lesser locations. In all likelihood, a study of the tax privileges dispensed to
Australia’s mainland capitals would disclose great similarity to Harrison’s analysis.

SCOPE FOR REPLACING TAXES WITH RESOURCE
RENT/LAND VALUE CAPTURE

In 2000, The Land Values Research Group (LVRG) commissioned Dr Terry Dwyer,
then visiting Fellow, National Centre for Development Studies, Asia Pacific School
of Economics and Management, Australian National University, to quantify
Australia’s natural resource rents. The result was a tabular time series analysis
from 1911 to 1999 published as The Taxable Capacity of Australian Land and
Resources in Australian Tax Forum, Volume 18, Number 1, 2003. Dr Dwyer
found that smoothed land incomes in the financial year 1998/99 had reached
134.1% of Australia’s total corporate and personal income tax. The LVRG has
extended Dr Dwyer’s analysis since 1999, using his technique of establishing the
value of land and other natural resources and then adding their current and
accrued yields. Annual resource values proved to be 22.41% of GDP in 1999, but
by 2005 they had grown to 32% of GDP, under the influence of what from 1996
to 2004 has been the greatest real estate bubble in Australia’s history. This
percentage of GDP was sufficient to have replaced taxation at all three levels of
government in Australia.

It may be argued that ‘economic rationalism’ has amounted to little more than
thirty years of government acquiescence to the private plunder of Australia’s
natural resources, and that the environment has suffered mightily as a
consequence. As resource rents may be seen to represent community, the
whittling away of the sense of community that has accompanied this quite
irrational period of our economic history cannot be considered coincidental.
Whereas the national accounts simply roll Australia’s earned incomes and
unearned natural resource rents together as ‘income’, using Dwyer’s study we
have disaggregated rent and taxes from GDP to arrive at the net earned incomes
of labour and capital in classical economic terms. These non-speculative incomes
are shown at Figure 1, together with the relatively small percentage of resource
rent which is currently collected for public revenue.

FIGURE 1

Economic rationalism is characterised in the chart by an upsurge in rent and rent-seeking from 1980, following the abolition of death duties, and the Whitlam
government assuming responsibility for funding a large part of local government.
The more extensively privatised capture of land rent and the concomitant
increase in taxation from this time is readily observable.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Other than providing some idea of the scope for reducing land prices and
rectifying a Mad Hatter’s Tea Party of taxes, the most striking feature of the chart
is its import for industrial relations reform. Under existing taxation arrangements,
labour and capital fight over the 40% of GDP remaining from earned incomes
after 28% of GDP has been taken from them by taxation and after 27% of the
32% of GDP comprising publicly generated resource rents has been creamed off
by private interests - many of whose names will be found listed each year in
Business Review Weekly’s “Australia’s Richest 200”.

Winning a greater share of land and resource rents is currently proving to be a
soft target for speculative capital. Therefore, both labour and capital appear to
have a common interest, not only in winning back some of the 28% of GDP taken
from their earned incomes in taxes, but also in seeking greater public capture of
Australia’s annual land values. Further analysis discloses that net earned incomes
have declined by 40% as a percentage of GDP since 1972, taxes have grown by
27%, and annual land values/resource rents or unearned incomes have grown by
160%. Whilst the earned incomes of many Australians may indeed have been
supplemented by land values, it may also be seen that this rapidly appreciating
natural resource fund has much to recommend it as the natural revenue base -
and from which an equal dividend may be delivered to all Australian citizens.

ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF THE PROPERTY MARKET
ON THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY

Other than recording building commencements and borrowings for the purchase
of real estate, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), the Reserve Bank of
Australia (RBA) and federal Treasury have shown little interest in quantifying the
overall Australian real estate market. The LVRG has therefore set out to fill
this void by gathering real estate sales at current prices from Australia’s six
States and two Territories, each of which by the mid-1980s collected, analysed
and published the details of its own real estate sales.

FIGURE 2

FIGURE 3

Figures 2 & 3 show that real estate sales turnover declined in the early 1990s
after the bursting of the 1988/89 bubble. Although it may not appear to be the
case, real estate sales actually proceeded quite sluggishly until 1996 - with the
exception of Queensland. Figure 2 shows Queensland’s sales prices surpassing
those of Victoria between 1991 and 1995, and closely approaching the New
South Wales juggernaut in 1993. Whilst Queensland did experience a strong real
estate boom from that time, this was not the case elsewhere in Australia where
the upward inflection in the sales graph includes major commercial and industrial
sales by banks as mortgagee-in-possession. Properties of lesser defaulters from
the late 1980s bubble had already been meted out onto extremely depressed
markets, but these larger commercial and industrial properties had been held
back whilst business bankers wrestled with their greater complexity.

In 2005, the volume of real estate activity in most states had either turned down
or levelled out; but in Western Australia it continued to climb, underpinned by
prosperity emanating from its extraordinary minerals boom. In Tasmania, the
highest number of migrants in a decade in the 2004 financial year was part of
the sharp increase evident in its real estate market between 2002 and 2004 in
Figure 3. This included immigrants who ‘sold down’ into the Tasmanian market to
realise capital gains and release funds on their higher valued mainland
properties.

THE AUSTRALIAN REAL ESTATE MARKET

We collated the values of states' and territories' property sales into a
national total in order to remove local influences and to permit comparison with
other national aggregates. This is shown here in nominal and real terms. (Figures 5 & 6)

Figure 5

Figure 6

The total number of sales (Figure 7) confirms the price of real estate to be
numbers-driven, sales in the troughs numbering from only 380,000 to 500,000,
whereas numbers at the peaks range from 500,000 to 767,000.

Figure 7

But what drives the numbers? It is difficult to resist the conclusion that, apart
from normal user demand, two pathologies are hard at work. One is the Mad
Hatter’s tax regime encouraging residential landlordism by granting deductions
for interest on the land price on an equal footing with productive business
investment, whilst the other is the herd mentality that arises, either when prices
in the real estate market start to boom or when, more rarely, they begin to fall.
On the latter occasions, residential landlords will be heard demanding that land
taxes be slashed, or seeking other government support to rectify their declining
capital gains. “Otherwise, we will stop providing rental housing.” God forbid the
creation of a genuine real estate market by deterring the private capture of
publicly-created asset values! Such fiscal discouragement would pose the pointed
question to those holding real estate assets: “Am I really using this property, or
simply seeking capital gain - thereby pricing future generations of Australians out
of home ownership?” In what market essential to human existence other than
real estate may anything achieve the incredibly generous capitals gains shown below
(Figure 4 - from Land Monopoly and Income Polarisation in Australia 1950 to
2000), simply by holding it off the market until the blackmail price is met for it?

Figure 4

THE BAROMETER OF THE ECONOMY

Australia’s total real estate sale prices, extrapolated back to 1972, was then
divided by gross domestic product (GDP) at current prices in order to provide an
aggregate adjusted for population growth and national movements in consumer
prices. The graph of the quotient at Figure 8 paints such an extraordinary picture
that we have nominated it The Barometer of the Economy. Not only does it provide at a glance Australia’s socio-economic record over the last thirty years, but it may be employed to forecast periods of economic growth or decline. Upward inflections in the barometer signify that real estate sales prices are outperforming economic growth, so these may be seen as property booms. A downward deflection, on the other hand, shows the economy to be doing better than the real estate market, and this clearly does not represent a property boom.

As a response to the recessionary fallout from the bursting of a worldwide
property bubble in the early 1970s, it became fashionable to reduce the
incidence of property-based revenues. The 1970s real estate bubble has virtually
been written out of history and blame for the resulting recession laid instead at
the foot of the simultaneous OPEC oil crisis. However, amongst other remaining
public records, the gigantic real estate bubble is well documented in a ten page
special report in TIME magazine of 1 October 1973, entitled The New American
Land Rush.

Figure 8

As with all recessions, the 1974/75 recession, heralded in Australia by the
collapse of Cambridge Credit and Dick Baker’s Mainline Corporation, affected
everyone badly, but the property investment lobby was successful in capturing
the ear of western governments by claiming that not only had its property values
fallen, but that property taxes had created the recession. Nothing could have
been further from the truth, but the media reported the property tax revolt
sympathetically. California’s Proposition 13, which put a ceiling on the property
tax in 1978, represented the full flowering of this putsch in the USA. [Pan the
property lobby’s propaganda cameras to Whistler’s mother being evicted onto
the sidewalk in her rocking chair!]

In Australia, although local government had once funded itself, Prime Minister
Gough Whitlam saw fit to support municipalities from federal taxation in order to
slow the naturally increasing growth in municipal rates. Shortly afterwards,
Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen removed probate duty from the statute books of
Queensland. Governments of the other states and territories followed suit, and
the federal government then proceeded to scrap estate duty. By 1980, growth in
local government rates had been constrained and the field of Australian death
duties entirely vacated. The coast was now clear for the 1981 residential real
estate bubble.

The Australian residential market grew from 64% to 80% as a proportion of the
total property market between 1984 and 2004, whilst the commercial/industrial
and rural categories both contracted to 10% (from 16% and 20%, respectively,
in 1984). Whereas Australia’s population grew by a factor of 1.36 between 1984
and 2004 (from 15 million to 20.4 million) and GDP increased in real terms by a
factor of 1.86, real land values increased a remarkable 3.2 times.

The barometer’s ‘bubble line’ has been pitched empirically at 19%, simply
because the boom appears to transform into a socially devastating bubble from
this point. For example, whereas no recession ensued in the decline of 1985/86
after the real estate market had peaked at a ratio of 18%, recession has followed
on each occasion the relationship has exceeded 19% - even at 19.24% in 1981.
So, while neo-classical economists seem unable to identify a bubble until it
bursts, the LVRG offers the following definition: an Australian real estate bubble
is any occasion when, in one financial year, total real estate sale prices exceed
19% of GDP.

The 1994 peak is an apparent exception in that real estate turnover exceeded
the ‘bubble line’ but no national recession followed. The explanation in this case
is that both the bubble and the ensuing recession were confined to Queensland.
Elsewhere in Australia, the peak in turnover in 1994 did not coincide with any
peak in prices, but was caused by banks divesting themselves of their remaining
portfolios of ‘distressed’ commercial and industrial properties overhanging from
the bursting of the property bubble in late 1989. The delay worked to the
advantage of the banks as land prices gradually began to recover. Price
escalation gained a momentum from 1996 which did not falter until the bubble
peaked in 2004.

Whereas the earlier 1987 to 1989 bubble had been driven mainly by the
commercial and industrial property markets in which the names Bond, Skase and
Elliott loomed large, and terms such as ‘the white shoe brigade’ were featured,
the recent eight-year land price phenomenon has notably been residentially
inspired. So, whether as owners or tenants, everyone has been directly involved
in this particular bubble.

The Barometer of the Economy indicates that, after the whole Australian real
estate market escalates from boom into bubble conditions, a national economic
recession may be expected to ensue within 24 months of the real estate sales to
GDP relationship cutting back below the 19% bubble line again. Swinging voters,
that is, those people not permanently committed to either one of the two major
parties, will usually throw the government of the day out at the next election,
influenced mainly by their ‘hip-pocket nerve’. An exception occurred when the
John Hewson-led federal Liberal opposition managed to lose ‘the unlosable’
election of 1993. That Hewson could not convince people on national TV how his
proposed goods and services tax would affect the prices of a normal cake and a
birthday cake differently played no trivial part in the Keating Labor government
being returned to office.

A pattern emerges. Commercial/industrial bubbles alternate with residential
bubbles, and major barometer peaks are found to be 15 to 16 years apart. There
will usually be a lesser mid-term event that may or may not be a national bubble.

The volume of debt contained within the height and breadth of the recent
residential bubble offers a strong degree of confidence to suggest that Australia
will experience a severe economic recession within two years of the graph
retreating back below the 19% bubble line. Scapegoats will undoubtedly be
sought for the crash, for what is fundamentally a systemic problem. It is the
natural, if constantly overlooked, outcome of a Mad Hatter’s tax regime which
suppresses employment and business activity as it works to inflate unsustainable
real estate bubbles.

In the mid-90s, Queensland went solo to inflate its own property bubble, much
the same as Western Australia has recently, and this coincided with property
bubbles in the South-East Asian tiger economies. Deep recessions in Queensland
and across South-East Asia in 1997 related entirely to the bursting of their real
estate bubbles and the unsustainable levels of debt contained therein. Although
the Howard government erroneously claimed responsibility for having averted
national recession in 1997, it will be unlikely to accept its real part in the tanking
of land prices by some 40% between 2005 and 2010. The subsequent mismatch
between record levels of household debt and declining asset values during the
period does not bode well for Australia’s social and economic health.

Sceptics may claim that the relationship between the Australian real estate
market and the economy is not causal, because the economy drives the real
estate market, not vice-versa; but this is not borne out by the facts. Figure 9
demonstrates that changes in the direction of the property market precede
matching changes in the direction of the economy. So, we may conclude that
economies march very much to the beat of pathological tax systems acting to
drive property markets into bubble fantasyland at relatively regular intervals.

Figure 9

Australian economic historians reported that “Early fluctuations in the Australian
economy were mainly connected with changing land prices. Two major boom
periods occurred in 1826-28 and 1837-39.” (The Australian Economy in Perspective).
The great Chicago land economist Homer Hoyt had also documented the
phenomenon of US property market peaks preceding each economic recession a
little further back, to 1818. Under tax systems designed to minimise land value
capture, it is difficult to imagine outcomes other than increasingly larger property
bubbles and greater ‘busts’.

That real estate currently drives the economy into boom and bust gives the lie to
the often quoted investment cycle diagram shown, which purports
the property market to be a lagging indicator.

Figure 10

LAND VALUES

The relationship between Australia’s total rateable land values (not to be
confused on this occasion with real estate sales) and GDP indicates the manner in
which Australia’s various tax regimes have shaped our land values since 1911;
this is shown at Figure 11. Over the period, the relationship has averaged one-to one.
Whereas the chart hit a notable peak of 1.5 in 1932 during the depression,
it now stands at a heady 2.5. The option of down-taxing labour and its products
and capturing a greater part of community-created land and resource values
offers government the only effective means of turning the portended recession
around quickly when the market does correct. Otherwise, the period of social and
financial distress promises to be protracted.

Figure 11

The best opportunity to institute a staged program to raise the level of public
land value capture is, of course, in the event of such a recession, when land
values will have already declined. It is on these occasions that government needs
to react in the interest of the general community rather than that of residential
landlords only, who will inevitably seek public compensation once again for their
own peculiar ‘burdens’.

ROLE OF THE RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA

The RBA was appointed to maintain economic prosperity by managing full
employment and stability of the Australian currency. The spirit of this brief is
violated when ‘full employment’ is quietly redefined as the ‘natural’ rate of
unemployment. More obviously, the RBA fails its brief every time a real estate
bubble is permitted to develop, because bubbles lead to recessions. The RBA can
therefore scarcely seek to skirt the issue by claiming that real estate bubbles are
beyond its jurisdiction. Nor may the Bank intend to cripple employment and
productive activity when it raises interest rates in order to deter speculative
borrowings at inflationary outbreaks; but, as interest rate policy notoriously fails
to distinguish between speculative and productive behaviours, the crippling of
employment and productive activity inevitably results.

As taxation growth is partly responsible for price inflation, the RBA is well placed
to advise a superior attack on inflation, based on the down-taxing of labor and its
products and greater capture of Australia’s annual land values. This would
complement interest rate policy and be the most direct way of deterring the
property market from escalating into bubble territory. At the same time, it would
make real estate eminently more affordable for future generations of Australians,
who would no longer need to compete with speculators. A side effect would be to
render Australian exports much more cost-competitive in international markets.

QUANTIFYING THE COST OF PROPERTY BUBBLES TO GDP

Question: How much GDP did Australia lose in 2005-6 as a consequence of the
bursting of the last three property bubbles and the ensuing interruptions to
economic growth?

The question would be pointless if there were no way to eliminate property
crashes. Nor could it be answered without a reasonable estimate of economic
growth based upon the absence of such crashes. Let’s look at these issues.
Boom-bust cycles are more correctly described as bubble-burst cycles. One can
eliminate the burst if one can eliminate the bubble, and one can eliminate the
bubble if one can obviate its cause. Prices become decoupled from earnings in a
bubble and are supported only by the assumption that someone else, the
‘greater fool’, will pay an even higher price at a later stage. When that
assumption loses credibility, that is, when the market runs out of greater fools,
there is no support for today's prices and the bubble bursts. Bubbles cannot
occur in the market for buildings, because buyers understand that the price of a
building is limited by its production cost, and this tends to decline with wear and
tear; there is no expectation of capital gains, nor of finding a ‘greater fool’. But
bubbles can and do occur in the market for land, because land, being a gift of
nature, does not have a production cost. A ‘property’ bubble is a land bubble.
But if a more substantial part, say at least half, of the rental value of land were
taken as public revenue, any land owner who failed to generate income from the
land would make recurrent cash losses, and would therefore feel pressured to use
the land more productively - or to sell it to someone who will. Thus it would
become unattractive to hold land for capital gains alone. Buyers would shift their
emphasis from capital gains to earnings, and much of the speculative motive that
inflates land bubbles would be removed. If the amount to be captured by
government were calculated on the basis of the capitalised value of a site, then
rising prices would cause holding costs to rise, which would repel buyers and
reduce prices, while falling prices would cause holding costs to fall, tending to
attract buyers and raise prices. Thus, land price growth would stabilise around
the long-term trend: competition among buyers, whose spending power is
influenced by economic growth, would cause land prices to grow, but grow no
faster than the maximum sustainable rate.

It is quite realistic therefore to believe that property bubbles, and the recession
following their bursting, may be eliminated. If Australia had done since 1972 as
we here advocate, what would be the typical rate of economic growth, and what
would be the effect on present day GDP? That part of the question is more
difficult, but a range of arguments may be put.

The public capture of half the rental value of land would release both land and
money for more productive projects by discouraging the holding of land for
speculative purposes. It would also permit reduction of taxes that feed into
prices, and thereby reduce inflationary tendencies, allowing more accommodating
monetary policy, reducing the internal rate of return needed for a viable
investment, and therefore increasing the available range of investments. The
need to find productive uses for land, or else sell it, would increase the supply of
commercial and residential accommodation, strengthening the bargaining
position of renters and buyers relative to lessors and sellers - thereby making
accommodation more affordable.

The foregoing is obviously extremely conducive to sustainable economic growth.
It is reasonable, if not conservative, to suppose that the typical rate of growth
achieved through such a deliberate pro-growth policy would be at least
comparable with the maximum rate of growth achieved by accident at certain
points of the bubble-burst cycle under current anti-growth policies.
It should be noted that elimination of bubbles also implies elimination of cycles,
and therefore of the retrogression in growth that occurs during each too-politely
named ‘business cycle’. Therefore, if we start with Australian GDP for the
financial year ending 1972, expressed in 2006 prices, and assume that the
highest real year-on-year GDP growth figure achieved since then had applied in
every year, GDP for the 2006 financial year would have been a staggering $1.98
trillion, that is, more than $1 trillion higher than it actually reached - as shown in
this spreadsheet.

It might be alleged that this approach is optimistic in that it fails to allow for
possible long-term variations in growth potential, and that it would therefore be
better to raise the hypothetical growth rate for each cycle to the highest actual
growth rate recorded within that cycle – ie. not the highest for the whole period
under study. Accepting this reasoning, if the cycles are taken as beginning in the
recession years, namely the financial years ended 1975, 1983 and 1991, and the
highest year-on-year growth figure for each cycle (or part thereof) is applied to
every year of the cycle, GDP in the financial year ended 2006 would nevertheless
still have been $700 billion greater, as also shown in the spreadsheet.

Even on the more conservative calculation, the GDP lost due to current tax policy
amounts to $35,000 per year for every man, woman and child in the country, a
figure that should give pause to all Australian policymakers and politicians.
Property owners might also consider how the additional spending power brought
about by tax cuts would affect the rental and resale value of their properties. In
the scenario painted by these figures, one cannot escape the conclusion that
property owners would also gain in absolute terms, regardless of the improved
bargaining power of tenants and buyers. It would seem that Charles Bazlinton’s
The Free Lunch, for all, may indeed be a possibility.

There is opportunity for economic modellers to improve this analysis. Precisely
how much existing ‘investment’ is speculative? What would be the quantitative
effect on economic growth if the speculation were redirected into productive
investment by public capture of at least one half of the publicly generated rental
value of land? If existing taxes were reduced by a matching amount, what would
be the effect on economic growth? In other words, can deadweight be redefined
in terms of growth rates in addition to effects on static GDP? When these
effects are quantified, is it possible that our more ‘optimistic’ estimate of
additional GDP as shown at Figure 12 will be proven to be conservative? It would
also stand to reason that GDP growth would be even greater were more than
50% of rent captured to the public purse and the deadweight costs of taxation
reduced accordingly. In any case, taking account of locational values and other
components of the 32% of the economy constituted by natural resource rents
might introduce greater reality into economic modelling.

Figure 12

The adverse effects of present tax policy are not limited to GDP. People working
longer and harder in downsized workplaces, and household debt levels having
risen to accommodate the phenomenon of earned incomes now being less as a
percentage of GDP than that which was received in 1972, characterise what are
bruited to be prosperous times. Government advisors, seeming to confuse
technological progress with economic progress and social welfare, succeed in
painting a scene of prosperity because escalating asset values mask the true
economic situation. The ‘wealth effect’ engendered by high land prices will prove
to be ephemeral, however, when lending institutions are found to have provided
credit against the ‘security’ of a bubble.

Nor are the adverse effects of taxation limited to the economy. Real estate
bubbles create a greater human footprint than is necessary on the natural
environment, as families requiring residential land must leapfrog over other land
held idle by speculators. This leads to sprawling cities and long commuting
distances. Meanwhile, as the RBA fights inflation by creating unemployment
through artificially high interest rates, workers tend to become less discriminating
about their job specifications. What logger of old growth forests, being a family
man, will act upon a twinge of conscience to leave his tractor to go to the
barricades against wood-chipping? He has a job to do and he will do it well.
Upton Sinclair put it succinctly: “It is difficult to get a man to understand
something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.” Nick Naylor,
the extremely successful lobbyist for the tobacco industry in the movie Thank You
For Smoking, also cuts right to the heart of the matter when he says that he is
directed by his mortgage to do what he does so well for a living. We might all be
better off if we were to rent our properties, Naylor suggests.

When people had cheap access to land and a new federal land ‘tax’, Australia
experienced the highest standard of living in the world. This study hints that she
might easily attain the position she occupied early in the twentieth century again
were she to exercise the same initiative to remedy what appears to be a
terminally ill tax regime.

It is more likely, however, that both sides of politics will continue to pay their
ritualistic deference to powerful landed interests for some time yet. Paradoxically,
this report suggests that retaining the status quo will not only adversely affect
the poor, the middle class, a sustainable environment, education, infrastructure
and health, but also Australia’s bunyip aristocracy itself.

The Mad Hatter’s Tea Party meanwhile remains Australia’s reality.

In a terribly sophisticated society, some truths go missing

John Locke (1632-1704)
Philosopher of Freedom

It is in vain in a country whose great fund is land to hope to lay the public charge on
anything else; there at last it will terminate. The merchant (do what you can) will not bear it, the laborer cannot, and therefore the landholder must: and whether he were best to do it by laying it directly where it will at last settle, or by letting it come to him by the sinking of his rents, which when they are fallen, everyone knows they are not easily raised again, let him consider.
- Some Considerations of the Lowering of Interest


LAND, n. A part of the earth's surface, considered as property. The theory that land is
property subject to private ownership and control is the foundation of modern society, and is eminently worthy of the superstructure. Carried to its logical conclusion, it means that some have the right to prevent others from living; for the right to own implies the right exclusively to occupy; and in fact laws of trespass are enacted wherever property in land is recognized. It follows that if the whole area of terra firma is owned by A, B and C, there will be no place for D, E, F and G to be born, or, born as trespassers, to exist.
- Ambrose Bierce "The Devil's Dictionary", 1911

Poverty is the mother of crime.
- Marcus Aurelius (121-180 AD)

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Australian real estate sales sources:
Department for Administration and Information Services, South Australia
Department of Land Administration, Western Australia
Department of Natural Resources, Queensland
Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment, Tasmania
Department of Urban Services, Planning and Land Management, Canberra
Office of State Revenue, New South Wales [to 1998*]
Office of The Valuer-General, Northern Territory
Office of The Valuer-General, Victoria
Residex Pty Ltd [*New South Wales data subsequent to 1998]
Australian Bureau of Statistics data:
Taxation Revenue, Australia, Catalogue 5506.0
Australian National Accounts, Catalogue 5204.0 (incl. Table 83 - land values)

© The Land Values Research Group, May 2007 All rights reserved.

Parts of this study may be reproduced if due acknowledgement is given.
The National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication
Kavanagh, Bryan, 1944-
Unlocking the Riches of Oz: a case study of the social and
economic costs of real estate bubbles 1972 to 2006.

Bibliography
ISBN 9780909946036 (pbk.).

1. Land speculation - Australia - Case studies.
2. Real estate investment - Australia - Case studies.
I. Land Values Research Group (Melbourne, Vic.).
II. Title.

333.33230994

The Land Values Research Group gratefully acknowledges a grant from the Henry
George Foundation of Australia for publication of this report, and the assistance
of Gavin Putland and Karl Fitzgerald in offering the author helpful suggestions. The use of Peter Nicholson's insightful cartoons does not imply that he supports the views of The Land Values Research Group. 

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